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Internal Displacement in Iraq:
Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory
Nancy Riordan
University of Massachusetts Boston
The protracted conflict in Iraq has led to one of the highest internal displacements of people
worldwide. With data from the International Organization for Migration’s Displacement
Tracking Matrix and other sources, geographic information system methods were applied to
investigate the quantitative and spatial characteristics of Iraq’s internally displaced persons
(IDPs). Based on this analysis, significant numbers of IDPs were found to be displaced among
the disputed territories of northern Iraq. The findings of this analysis, when paired with
additional research, poses serious complications not only for the security of Iraq’s IDPs but also
for the country. The proliferation of militias and ISIL into these territories will prolong the wider
conflict and intensify the territorial dispute between the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan
Regional Government, in particular the final status of At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) governorate.

__________________________________________________________
As

we entered 2015, 38 million people around the world had become internally displaced
persons (IDPs) due to armed conflict.1 The majority were victims of the ongoing conflicts in
Iraq, Syria, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria.2
In 2014, Iraq experienced the highest internal displacement worldwide, with 2.2 million
persons newly displaced. By June 30, 2015, according to estimates by the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, 4 million Iraqis were internally displaced.3
Violence and persecution on the basis of political affiliation and ethnic and religious identity
have historically driven displacement in Iraq.4 The massive wave of displacement occurring
since 2014 is largely attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)5—yet people
are fleeing their homes (and suffering repeated displacements) not only because of atrocities
committed by ISIL; they are fleeing also because of atrocities committed by other armed groups,
including Shia militia, and bombings by pro-government forces in the battle to control and regain
control over strategic territory.6 Several reports have warned that once ISIL is defeated in Iraq,
the conflicts that existed before the rise of the organization, expressly those over disputed
territory, will inhibit the return of IDPs and continue to destabilize the country.7
The IDP crisis we are witnessing has a cumulative aspect that includes:


the unresolved historical displacement of Iraq’s Kurds, Turkmen, and other minorities
through successive measures by the Iraqi government, under Saddam Hussein, to
“Arabize” the oil-rich northern territories;8
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attempts by Kurdish authorities since 2005 to reshape the demographic balance in their
favor, especially in Ninewa and At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk);9
displacement during the years of U.S.-led occupation, particularly at the height of the
insurgency that engulfed Iraq in 2006–8 and subsequent violence;10
the current battle against ISIL, which is triggering the most recent and largest wave of
IDPs in the country’s history.11

In her 2008 analysis on the Iraq crisis for the Brookings Institution, Elizabeth Ferris suggests:
“Displacement is not just an accidental by-product of the conflict, but is both an objective and a
strategy in the military struggle—a way of consolidating territorial and political control.”12 This
point is especially significant with regard to patterns of displacement among Iraq’s disputed
territories.13
The disputed territories are a resource-rich swath of land—comprising fifteen districts
within Ninawa, At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk), Arbil, Sala ad-Din, and Diyala governorates14—that
separates the Kurdistan region (officially Dihok, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah) from the rest of Iraq.
The strip of territories runs from “Sinjar in the north west, via Tel Afar, Mosul, Kirkuk and Tuz
Khurmatu to Khanaqin and Mandali east of Baghdad, where Arab, Kurd, Turkoman,
Chaldean/Assyrian and Shabak communities have coexisted [and inter married] for hundreds of
years. Religiously, they include Sunni and Shiite Muslims of various schools, Christians of
several denominations and (Zoroastrian) Yazidis.”15 In particular, At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk)
governorate, the epicenter of northern Iraq’s oil and gas industry is at the very heart of the
territorial dispute between the government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG).16
Article 140 of Iraq’s 2005 constitution was formulated to resolve the final status of all the
disputed territories, principally At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk), through three steps: normalization
(resettlement of those who were displaced during the “Arabization” campaign, including
property claims) followed by a census and then a referendum to determine whether the territories
would remain under the control of the government in Baghdad or become part of the autonomous
Kurdistan region.17
Yet the constitution itself is immersed in controversy and conflict. From its rushed creation
during a foreign occupation—largely benefiting Iraq’s Shia and Kurds to the detriment of Sunnis
and multiple minority groups—to absolute political malfunction, delaying implementation of
vital articles as well as unenforced provisions for their amendment that is tied to linguistic and
interpretive ambiguities for which all sides have tried to use to their advantage.18 Much has been
written about the foundational constitutional problems plaguing governance in Iraq, whether
centralized or devolved, for regional and provincial autonomy (linked to disputed territory) that
is not to be based on ethnicity or religion and how these core issues have fueled the unending
civil strife and insurgency that has resulted in massive displacement and hundreds of thousands
of casualties. Ten years of political deadlock, rampant corruption, and widespread human rights
abuses provided fertile ground for the extremism of ISIL and others to take root, leaving the shell
of a failing state unable to provide Iraqis the most basic services, not to mention security, now in
the hands of local militias.19 Blame for the chaos in Iraq is widespread, but no matter where the
finger of condemnation points, it is a collective political failure, marred by external interference
and sectarian self-interest, where the unresolved issue of disputed territory is a case in point.
To better understand the complexity of reconciling the dueling historical narratives and
contested claims to these lands,20 consider Stefan Wolff’s explanation of one aspect, the At2
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Ta’mim (Kirkuk) territorial dispute, which, he says, “occurs on three levels and has two
dimensions.” “It is a dispute,” he writes,
among Kirkuk’s communities (principally Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen), a dispute between
Baghdad and Erbil, and a dispute that draws in regional powers (principally Turkey). At stake are
the territorial–political status of Kirkuk in Iraq and the internal governance arrangements in
Kirkuk. Kirkuk, in other words, falls into a category of territorial disputes that are essentially
about territorial control which the disputants seek for themselves (Baghdad, Erbil, local Kirkuk
communities) or seek to prevent others from obtaining (Turkey) for a variety of reasons ranging
from strategic value (e.g. control of major transport and communication arteries, access to the
open sea, military defensibility) and economic gain (e.g. the natural resources located in the
disputed territory, and the tax revenue, goods and services generated there) to political
significance (e.g. the precedent of how dealing with one specific territorial dispute will affect the
likelihood and outcome of others) and cultural importance (e.g. territory as an ancient homeland,
mythical place of origin, site of events defining group identity, etc.).21

Despite sincere efforts at the provincial level by Iraqis themselves and multiple interventions
aimed at resolving the dispute through dialogue and negotiations, especially that of the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate under resolution 1770 to oversee and
guide the process, these efforts could not move the GOI and KRG stakeholders to break the
political deadlock and implement or amend key inextricably linked constitutional articles—in
particular, those that involve federalism, oil and gas and revenue sharing, and the status of
disputed territories.22
This article has three objectives. The first objective is to raise awareness of the widespread
humanitarian crisis of displacement in Iraq, which has been overshadowed by the war in Syria,
the threat of ISIL, and the massive influx of multinational refugees and migrants overwhelming
Europe. The second is to contribute to the analytical discussion of displacement in Iraq with an
emphasis on IDPs in disputed territories and the factors that will complicate their return and
further entrench the conflict. The third is to provide a basis for a return to negotiations among all
actors—the GOI, the KRG, provincial councils, and UNAMI and other international
stakeholders—directly or indirectly involved with negotiations on the legacy of TAL58 and
Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution and final status of the disputed territories.23

Mapping Displacement: Data and Methodology
The world’s most complex armed conflicts and their associated consequences, such as internal
displacement, have geographic characteristics. Humanitarian and other organizations, responding
to the crisis of displacement, are allowing researchers open access to their databases. Many of
these databases are geographically referenced, that is, they contain latitudinal and longitudinal
coordinates, and they can be mapped using geographic information systems (GIS). GIS enables
visualization, analysis, and interpretation of data (quantitative and spatial) that increases our
understanding of complex relationships, patterns, and trends—effectively creating coherence out
of the chaos of war.
After an evaluation of studies on IDPs in Iraq, further research was conducted to gather data
that was geographically referenced and could be mapped using a GIS platform.24 The findings in
this article are based on multiple studies and two data sources: the International Organization for
Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix, primarily, and Global Shelter Cluster.25
Country and administrative boundaries for Iraq were acquired from Natural Earth and the
3
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database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM).26 One complication was the discovery early
on that the spelling of governorates and districts within the country and administrative boundary
map layers do not match the spellings found in databases on IDPs; they had to be changed to
match exactly. Place names have multiple spellings because names have nationalistic and
historical significance to Iraq’s Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, as well as its numerous minorities,
including Assyrians and other sects. GADM spellings were matched with data tables to avoid
drawing errors in the geoprocessing steps. These spellings are used throughout this discussion for
consistency (except when quoted from other sources) and have no intended bias. Also, the borders
of districts within disputed territory are contested by multiple overlapping claims at the local
level and by the GOI and KRG. For consistency, the districts listed in UNAMI’s 2009 mandated
assessment were used in maps created for this article.27 All maps are approximations and do not
imply endorsement or negation of any particular territorial claim.

Maps and Analysis

Data sources: IOM (DTM [Displacement Tracking Matrix]) and GSC [Global Shelter Cluster], November 30, 2015; GADM and Natural Earth
boundaries.

Map 1 (left). Thematic representation of IDPs by governorate. Map 2 (right). Shows georeferenced locations using a dot density method. Map 2 reveals that the issue of displacement is
prevalent across Iraq and the Kurdistan region, with IDPs in every governorate. Map 1 reveals
that though the crisis is widespread, some governorates host few IDPs, while four governorates
in the center and north of the country host the highest numbers.
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Data sources: GSC, November 30, 2015; GADM administrative boundaries.

Map 3. Thematic representation of IDPs by governorate and shelter type. Expanding
on Map 1, this map reveals further patterns of displacement. Countrywide, camps are
the least likely shelter type, and except for Baghdad, most camps are located in
districts now controlled by the KRG.

Kurdistan Region

Mandali

Data sources: Disputed Territory (UNAMI 2009); GADM administrative boundaries.

Map 4. The fifteen districts that make up the disputed territories of northern Iraq.
UNAMI’s 2009 assessment lists the districts as follows: “Sinjar, Tal Afar, Til Kaef,
Sheikhan, Akre, Hamdaniya, Makhmour (within Arbil), Al Hawija, Dibis, Daquq,
5
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Kirkuk, Tuz, Kifri and Khanaqin, as well as the sub-district of Mandali in Baladruz
district.”28

Mosul

Mandali

Data sources: IOM, (DTM) and GSC; November 30, 2015; GADM administrative boundaries.

Map 5. Thematic map of IDPs in the disputed territories of northern
Iraq. Of the 3.2 million IDPs in the entire country, 672,360 are in the
disputed territories.

Capital city, Kirkuk

Data sources: IOM, (DTM) and GSC; November 30, 2015; GADM administrative boundaries.
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Map 6. Distribution of IDP population in At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) governorate.
The total population of the governorate is estimated to be 1.3 million; the
total number of IDPs in the governorate is 381,576.29

Findings
IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix data tables contain thousands of unique entries on 3.2
million displaced individuals and families in Iraq. When a GIS methodology was used to query
this vast displacement data, quantitative and spatial patterns of IDPs in disputed territories
emerged. Below is a synopsis of what this finding entails. The following section discusses its
implications.


While the displacement crisis in Iraq is widespread, a majority of IDPs are located in four
governorates: Baghdad, 585,498; al-Anbar, 573,450; Dihok, 423,846; and At-Ta’mim
(Kirkuk), 381,576 (see Map 1). IOM reports that 87 percent of IDPs are originally from
three governorates: Anbar, 42 percent (1,334,592 individuals); Ninewa, 32 percent
(1,011,606); and Salah al-Din, 13 percent (407,142), suggesting that an overwhelming
majority of IDPs are Sunni.30
 Countrywide, camps represent the minimum shelter type with most camps located in the
Kurdistan region (see Map 3). A majority of IDPs are residing in private settings
(including rentals) and critical shelter arrangements. Of disputed territory, At-Ta’mim
(Kirkuk) governorate hosts the largest number if IDPs who are residing in private settings
(including rentals). Shelter types raise concerns about intentions and the permanence of
IDP populations because of a history of forced displacement, resettlement, and denial of
return in order to engineer demographic outcomes.
 Of the 672,360 IDPs located within the fifteen districts comprising the disputed
territories, more than half are located in At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) governorate, 381,567(see
Map 5).
 Kirkuk is also a subdistrict of the larger At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) governorate and holds
255,432 IDPs. The estimated population of the subdistrict (before IDPs) is 600,000–
700,000, a majority of whom are in Kirkuk city (see Map 6).
 The current conflict (beginning in 2014) displaced 2.2 million Iraqis. Since 2014,
between 381,567 and 500,000 IDPs were displaced to and within At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk)
governorate, a number that has fluctuated as some IDPs were re-displaced or attempted to
return to their homes.
 More than 97,000 IDPs across Iraq originate from At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) governorate.
Internal and external displacement of this size will weigh heavily on the demographic
calculations in the district and wider governorate, further complicating the effort to
conduct a census and a referendum on final status. At the height of the displacement crisis
in 2014, at least 500,000 Iraqis had fled to the governorate.31 Events in At-Ta’mim
(Kirkuk) Haweeja district in 2013 are thought to be the spark that reignited the
insurgency, setting the stage for a resurgence of ISIL in Arab-majority provinces.32
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Factors Complicating IDP Return and Intensifying the Conflict
The normalization process called for in Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution, which was to be the
first step in resolving the status of the disputed territories, is incomplete, and a national census
that was scheduled for 2009 was postponed indefinitely over fears it could stoke ethnic and
sectarian tensions.33 The original deadline for a referendum on Article 140 was the end of 2007;
between November 2007 and January 2009, it was postponed four times. The recent and ongoing
massive influx of hundreds of thousands of IDPs into these territories since 2014 compounds
historic displacement and complicates any chance at reviving implementation of the steps
outlined in Article 140 leading to a referendum. In turn, the security of all IDPs, whether from or
within the disputed territories, is highly precarious; countless areas are littered with unexploded
ordinances.34 Many IDPs cannot return for fear of reprisals or because their homes have been
destroyed or overtaken. They may lack personal identification and documentation of their
property.35 They may face return and resettlement against their will as opposing factions seek to
consolidate territorial and political control. They may endure a long and uncertain limbo until
ISIL in Iraq is defeated, multiple other hostilities are ended, and territorial disputes are
resolved.36
When the Iraqi Security Forces retreated from the disputed areas in 2014, as ISIL advanced,
the KRG Peshmerga forces, backed by international air strikes that began in September 2014,
effectively took control of At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk), solidifying their claims to all of the territory.37
By April 2015, according to Denise Natali, the Peshmerga had regained about 25 to 30 percent of
territories lost to ISIS. But, she points out, “the Peshmerga haven’t been a total success story;
Peshmerga forces are using coalition air strikes to engineer territorial and demographic changes
that are antagonizing Sunni Arabs—the very communities the United States needs on its side to
degrade [ISIL].”38
The flood of IDPs out of, within, and into At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) and other territories remains
a fluid humanitarian crisis with ISIL entrenched within and along the boundaries of these
districts, creating incalculable misery for the displaced and causing untenable economic strain on
host communities and deepening pre-existing tensions. The risk of additional intercommunal
conflict is high.
Officials in At-Ta’mim (Kirkuk) have said the number of IDPs now in the governorate is too
much to accept, especially for Kirkuk city, which is already suffering difficult economic
circumstances, including rising unemployment.39 In August 2015, Kirkuk’s provincial council
ruled that people displaced from Diyala and living in Kirkuk would have one month to leave,
contravening international principles, wherein civilians have the right to seek safety in another
part of a country and are legally entitled to protection against forcible return or resettlement.40
While the city’s capacity to provide services to its own citizens is overburdened, many suspect
that the threat of removal is an attempt to enforce a Kurdish demographic, since a majority of the
displaced people from Diyala are Sunni Arabs.41
Despite the perceived demographic threat, territorial control is complete. Ahmad Askari, a
provincial security official in Kirkuk, said that setting a deadline for Article 140 is no longer
necessary. He said that the territories are already under Kurdish control and “the Iraqi army will
never be able to return to Kirkuk.”42 KRG president Masoud Barzani has also announced that he
considers Article 140 no longer valid and that “Kurdish control over Kirkuk and other areas
disputed with Baghdad is final.”43
On November 6, 2015, Kirkuk governor Najmaldin Karim said that Peshmerga forces would
not leave areas now under their control. He urged lawmakers to come up with legal means to
8
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include the disputed governorate in the KRG’s administration, saying, “We believe that Kirkuk
is Kurdistan; there’s no question about it.”44
Unilateral moves by the KRG not only challenge the aims of disenfranchised Sunni Arabs.45
These actions also place the KRG in direct confrontation with minority groups, such as the
Turkmen and Assyrians, who have strongly resisted having their areas become majority Kurdish
governorates or territory belonging to the KRG.46 After years of dysfunction and marginalization
by the central government in Baghdad (under former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki), Sunni
Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrians have petitioned for greater autonomy (on par with rights that
Kurds themselves have exercised in their own autonomous region),47 yet they remain committed
to Iraq’s territorial boundaries.48
Further inflaming the crisis are the intentions of Iraq’s Shia militia groups, as predicted by
Stratfor analysts:
The Islamic State threat provides a useful pretext for Shiite militias to move into disputed
territories like Kirkuk, where they can then try to reshape the demographics of the
province by giving abandoned Kurdish property to cooperative Arabs as people start
returning to areas where the Islamic State has been flushed out. Growing local Arab
resistance to Kurdish rule, along with the ethnic and sectarian violence that ensues as
Shiite militias target Sunni communities in these territories, will continue to challenge
Arbil’s authority in the Sunni-Kurdish borderland. . . . The battle over Kirkuk will
intensify as Shiite militias inevitably encroach on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s
claimed sphere of influence. This competition could result in violent clashes between
peshmerga and Shiite militias, an outcome that the Islamic State would welcome as it
tries to hold its position in the north. The Islamic State remains a priority threat for both
Baghdad and Arbil, but that threat alone will not be enough to allow for a sustainable
compromise on energy exports, much less to neutralize the territorial competition over
Kirkuk.49
Military escalation undoubtedly will contribute to more displacement in Iraq. Military solutions
that do not simultaneously include addressing the root causes of conflict—such as greater
autonomy for Iraq’s provinces, which has been held up over resolving disputed territory—will
produce only temporary gains and risk intensifying the conflict in other unpredictable ways. The
January 2016 operation to retake Ramadi from ISIL created 400,000 new IDPs and has left the
city uninhabitable.50 Depending on how the imminent Mosul51 offensive is managed, an
additional 1.5 million people could be displaced.52

Conclusion
The return to full-blown insurgency and civil war in Iraq,53 in a form more insidious than ever,
with ISIL and other armed groups,54 has led to massive internal displacement of the Iraqi
population, to a large extent within disputed territories. In some instances, entire communities
have been displaced.55 The fate of the displaced remains highly uncertain. ISIL and a complex
fusion of aligned and opposing militias, the Iraqi Security Forces, and KRG Peshmerga, with the
support of the international coalition, are now positioned within and along the string of
governorates and subdistricts that comprise the disputed territories56 abutting the Kurdistan
region—an impending nightmare scenario of war between Arabs and Kurds that was predicted
9
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years before the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, should the GOI and KRG fail to make progress
towards resolution of the dispute.57 With the ongoing battle against ISIL, the issue of disputed
territory has been shelved. Any military strategy for defeating ISIL in Iraq, however, and
bringing lasting stability to the country requires addressing this issue head on.58
The following recommendations are a short list of possible next steps:


Encourage the U.N. Security Council, UNAMI, and the countries participating in the
international coalition against ISIL to take measures to bring the GOI, KRG, and
provincial councils to the negotiation table without delay to discuss the status of the
disputed territories.59
 Make further military and financial aid to the GOI and KRG conditional on sincere
efforts to enter and sustain meaningful negotiations; reallocate aid to fund special
constitutional review committees and negotiation committees.
 Determine whether the GOI, KRG, KPC, and other provincial councils would find it
useful to return to the Helsinki process as a framework and to provide an impartial
consultation/safety net throughout negotiations.60
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